Interesting Creditor Case Law

Here's another interesting case:

Collection letter may be sent after debtor requests no further contact--

After being contacted several times by a collection agency, the debtor sent a letter asking it not to contact him anymore. However, the agency sent another letter asking him to "select one of the following payment arrangements" and stating, "This is an attempt to collect a debt". The Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) requires that once a debtor asks the collection agency to stop, it can contact him only to say that it is: (a) giving up; or (b) pursing a "remedy" such as a repossession, garnishment or a lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit ruled that an additional letter can also qualify as a "remedy" under the FDCPA.

 

Thought I would post several cases that I've seen on the Internet. Others may want to add to this list, or direct to another thread that has a list of cases.

Collection of an old debt violates FDCPA.

A debtor had a $1,200 outstanding balance on a credit card account that she had not used in 13 years. The collection agency bought the debt and sent her a letter stating: "This is an opportunity to resolve your account with no further collection action be taken against you". The debtor sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claiming that the debt was time-barred because the statute of limitations is only ten years. The debtor claimed deceptive practices in violation of the FDCPA, premised on the debt collector's knowing attempts to collect time-barred debts. The dispositive fact is that a debt collector could not legally prevail on such a lawsuit and for the debt collector to represent otherwise is fraudulent. The collection agency attempted to distinguish its letter--which did not mention a lawsuit--from the letters at issue in earlier cases where collection agencies had either threatened to sue or actually sued on a time-barred debt. But the court refused to draw that distinction. (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois)

 

Here's the address where I saw the case description:

http://www.legalsurvival.com/Debtor_and_Creditor/

All three Debtor Case Law descriptions that I posted today were listed at this site. It does not give the name of the case but I'll try to track it down with a Google search.

Hope more people will add cases to this thread. I'll copy the case I posted in another thread to this thread as well.

 

Here's the address where I saw the case description:

http://www.legalsurvival.com/Debtor_and_Creditor/

All three Creditor Case Law descriptions that I posted today were listed at this site. It does not give the name of the case but I'll try to track it down with a Google search.

Hope more people will add cases to this thread. I'll copy the case I posted in another thread to this thread as well.

 

Here's that case from the other thread--


Collection agency must report oral dispute.

A debtor notified a collection agency by telephone that he was disputing a debt for unpaid rent. The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, held that the agency was required under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) to inform credit reporting agencies of the dispute. The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating any credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a debt is disputed. The agency argued that it had not violated the Act because the tenant never disputed the debt in writing. However, the court ruled that the plain language of the FDCPA requires debt collectors to communicate the disputed status of a debt if the debt collector "knows or should know that the debt is disputed". This standard requires no notification by the consumer, written or oral. Instead, it depends solely on the debt collector's knowledge that a debt is disputed, regardless of how or when the knowledge is acquired.

 

Here's more on the Oral Dispute case which you can find in detail at this address:

http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=98-1497.01A

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1497 WILLIAM H. BRADY v. CREDIT RECOVERY COMPANY, INC. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ____________________ ____________________ November 18, 1998


....This case thus turns on a narrowquestion of statutory construction: Should  1692e(8) of theFDCPA -- which on its face does not impose a writing requirement-- be read to impose a writing requirement on a consumer whowishes to dispute a debt? "In a statutory construction case, the beginning pointmust be the language of the statute, and when a statute speakswith clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute'smeaning in all but the most extraordinary circumstance isfinished." Riva v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003,1007 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Estate of Cowart v. NicklosDrilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)) (internal quotation marksomitted). In other words, the court need not consult legislativehistory and other aids to statutory construction when the wordsof the statute neither create an ambiguity nor lead to anunreasonable interpretation. Riva, 61 F.3d at 1007 (quotationsomitted). In searching a statute's text to determinecongressional intent, we attribute to words that are not definedin the statute itself their ordinary usage, while keeping in mindthat meaning can only be ascribed to statutory language if thatlanguage is taken in context. Id. (quotations omitted). Applying these tenets, we conclude that  1692e(8) does notimpose a writing requirement on a consumer who wishes to disputea debt. Because the FDCPA does not include the terms "dispute"or "disputed debt" in the section devoted to definitions, see 15U.S.C.  1692a, we look first to ordinary usage. In ordinaryEnglish "dispute" is defined as a "verbal controversy" and"controversial discussion." Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary (3d ed. 1971). Clearly, the ordinary usage of"dispute" does not contemplate a writing. See id. Defendantsargue that a writing requirement should be implied from othersections of the statute and from context. We address thesearguments. First, defendants argue that we need not resort toordinary usage because the FDCPA does in fact define the term"disputed debts." In support of this contention, defendantspoint to  1692g(b) which is captioned "disputed debts." See 15U.S.C.  1692g(b). Although we cannot assume that  1692g(b)defines this term simply because of its caption, see Pub. L. 90-321,  502 (May 29, 1968), 82 Stat. 146, 147, reported as a notefollowing 15 U.S.C.  1601 (forbidding reliance on captions),defendants contend that the text of  1692g(b) provides adefinition of "disputed debts" that carries over to  1692e(8). We disagree. As stated above, we must keep in mind that meaning canonly be ascribed to statutory language if that language is takenin context. See Riva, 61 F.3d at 1007. Viewing the language of 1692e(8) in the context of other provisions of the FDCPA, itmakes logical sense to conclude that the meaning of "disputeddebt" in  1692g(b) does not carry over to  1692e(8). First, the fact that other sections of the FDCPA --like  1692g(b) -- explicitly impose a writing requirementsuggests that Congress's omission of such a requirement in 1692e(8) was not inadvertent. Moreover, a closer examination ofthe purposes and effects of the two provisions further supportsour conclusion that Congress intended to require a writing under 1692g(b) but not under  1692e(g). Under section 1692g(b) a consumer must dispute a debtin writing, within an initial thirty-day period, in order totrigger a debt validation process. See 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b). Once a consumer exercises this right, a debt collector must ceaseall further debt collection activity until it complies withvarious verification obligations. See id. Section 1692g(b) thusconfers on consumers the ultimate power vis-a-vis debtcollectors: the power to demand the cessation of all collectionactivities. See id. Recognizing the broad consumer powergranted by this provision, Congress expressly conditioned itsexercise on the submission of written notification within alimited thirty-day window. See id. In contrast,  1692e(8) does not affect debt collectionpractices at all. See 15 U.S.C.  1692e(8). Instead,  1692e(8)merely requires a debt collector who knows or should know that agiven debt is disputed to disclose its disputed status to personsinquiring about a consumer's credit history. See id. Given themuch more limited effect of this provision, Congress's decisionnot to condition its exercise on the submission of writtennotification makes logical sense. Our conclusion that  1692g(b) does not define"disputed debt" for the entire FDCPA is further supported by thelanguage of  1692e(8) itself. If the meaning of "disputed debt"as used in  1692g(b) carried over to  1692e(8), then, in orderto trigger the limited protection of  1692e(8), a consumer wouldbe required to submit written notice to a debt collector withinthe initial thirty-day period. See 15 U.S.C.  1692g(b). Butthe plain language of  1692e(8) requires debt collectors tocommunicate the disputed status of a debt if the debt collector"knows or should know" that the debt is disputed. See 15 U.S.C. 1692e(8). This "knows or should know" standard requires nonotification by the consumer, written or oral, and instead,depends solely on the debt collector's knowledge that a debt isdisputed, regardless of how or when that knowledge is acquired. See id. Applying the meaning of "disputed debt" as used in 1692g(b) to  1692e(8) would thus render the provision's "knowsor should know" language impermissibly superfluous. See UnitedStates v. Bailey, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Ratzlaf v.United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994) ("Judges shouldhesitate . . . to treat [as surplusage] statutory terms in anysetting . . . ."). III. CONCLUSION We therefore conclude that  1692e(8) does not impose awriting requirement on consumers who wish to dispute a debt. Forthe foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's order ofdismissal/grant of summary judgment and remand this case foraction consistent with this opinion.