Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? Which brings us back around to Southlands issue. If one has an legitimate argument which can be construed either way Southland, as you've seen demonstrated right here in this thread, you have the makings of a disagreement with your adversary, which may be resolved ONLY before a jury, or by a judge. If one has such an argument, isn't this beginning to sound like the makings of a potential countersuit? (which was my whole point in the first place). .
Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? JDP, if you can link me to the Congressional Record on that last point I shall promptly admit complete defeat.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? "I'll give ya this much JDP. I may lose my argument in court but I'd LOVE to push the argument anytime. I'd be confident." I don't have that luxury. I never said Graziano was "good case law". It is just law, and can't be changed in any of my filings...it's the law in MY backyard.
Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? The NCLC doesn't have any top secret documentation from the FTC. C'mon, it is as middle of the road with conflicting cases in the 1 case you cite as it is with the one JDP cited. IF there is a CA following the law it is Bill and those posting at that site. If all CA's followed Bill's example and erred with caution and followed their responsibilities, we'd not be here, nor have a leg to stand on, AND, the CA's would have an easier time actually collecting. The few law abiding CA's aren't the problem. Did I miss roll call? Agreed. Sassy
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? Yes, the same. I was trying to help Butch's position with that actually, because beyond the pissing over cases and where they are good to use in court, he made a good point about those who are unable to read and write. However, all the cases seem to agree, that even a verbal dispute only provides a consumer limited protection. It will be interesting to follow a case where an argument is made by one who can't read or write, why they as a consumer aren't entitled to the same protections as the rest of us. I didn't know we were talking about the relationship between the 2, nor the duty to comply with e(8) specifically. What was your position when you filed, that your report should have been updated to disputed based on an oral dispute? LOL, the other was Chaudhry, from a previous thread and previously linked. It is interesting that Chaudhry relies on Graziano v Harrison, and both of those courts stated that the 30-day validation period was a firm grace period -- also long since clarified that it is not a grace period. Again, it is important to read Chaudhry knowing that he and his attorney were both sanctioned by the court for pursuing groundless FDCPA claims. Mahon v Credit Bureau of Placer County is the 3rd. I know you don't like the Spears case; however, it says just the opposite, at issue was the amount of attorney's fees, not the entire debt. You don't think that referring to an "account" versus a "debt" is misleading or limiting? One could obtain verification of the account but that wouldn't necessarily be verification that the verified account belongs to the one being dunned. I'd not argue it, unless it was part of a series of violations. When a CA begins with violations, the near sure thing is, there will be more. Which reminds me, if you wouldn't mind sharing, the FDCPA does not require any communication with a consumer at all. As southland received his validation rights in the form of a summons/ complaint as an initial communication, is there an assumption somewhere that most CA's provide the validation notice -- frequently people don't find out about a collection account until they happen to review their reports, if ever. Do you think the lack of an initial communication with the consumer giving the validation notice is a violation? Sassy
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? You won't link to anything from the FTC that you said specifically supported your position but you want JDP to link to the congressional record. Again, from Edelman: DEBT COLLECTION WARNING:15 U.S.C. §1692e(11) Since December 30, 1996, 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11) has prohibited: The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action. Section 1692e(11) formerly required that the debt collector "disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose." 15 U.S.C. §1692e(11). Prior to the enactment of the FDCPA, debt collectors would send people mail purporting to seek employment references, inviting the recipient to collect a prize, or otherwise disguising its true purpose. One enterprising pair of debt collectors operated under such names as "National Research Company," "National Marketing Service," "United States Credit Control Bureau," "Claims Office," "Bureau of Verification," "Bureau of Reclassification," "Reverification Office" and "Disbursements Office". They would disseminate -- at the rate of 700,000 every six months -- forms with titles such as "Current Employment Records" and "Change of Address" and requesting address, employment, banking, and similar information. They also sent out "Claimants Information Questionnaires" asking the recipient to verify that he or she was the party entitled to receive unclaimed money. Mohr v. FTC, 272 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1959) (affirming first cease and desist order); People v. National Research Co., 201 Cal.App.2d 765, 20 Cal.Rptr. 516 (1962) (injunctive action to restrain practices); In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1963) (contempt proceeding based on first cease and desist order); Floersheim v. FTC, 411 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming another cease and desist order); Floersheim v. Weinburger, 346 F.Supp. 950 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, Floersheim v. Engman, 161 U.S.App. D.C. 30, 494 F.2d 949 (1973) (attempted declaratory action by collectors seeking to determine whether they were in compliance with the second cease and desist order); United States v. Floersheim, . CV 74‑484‑RF, 1980 WL 1852, 1980 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 11788, 1980-2 CCH Trade Cas. ¶63,368 (C.D.Cal. 1980) (civil penalty action for noncompliance with second cease and desist order). Other debt collectors used notices representing that the sender had correspondence or packages for delivery to a debtor; these would be sent to references used by a debtor. Dejay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 200 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1952); Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1952). In In re London Credit & Discount Corp., 78 FTC 541 (1971) (consent order), debt collectors sent letters purporting to be connected with auditing procedures. The collectors were enjoined from "Representing, directly or by implication, that any letter, demand, inquiry or other communication originated by respondents was originated by an independent auditing or any other person, firm or corporation." Another such consent order was entered in In re Marjorie P. Ingram, 67 FTC 1065 (1965), where the collectors were enjoined from falsely "[r]epresenting, directly or by implication, that the respondents are engaged in the business of auditing the accounts and records of others." (67 FTC at 1072) See also, Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Arizona, 77-174, 1977 Ariz. AG LEXIS 66 (Sept. 5, 1977), finding it improper for a collection agency to send out documents entitled "Audit Verification." Yet other collectors called themselves "State Credit Control Board", Slough v. FTC, 396 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968), "Business Research" and "Affiliated Credit Exchange," Bernstein v. FTC, 200 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1952), "Manpower Classification Bureau" and "American Deposit System," Rothschild v. FTC, supra, 200 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1952), "General Forwarding System," Silverman v. FTC, 145 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1944), "National Retail Board of Trade" and "National Liquidators, Inc.", In re National Retail Board of Trade, 57 FTC 666 (1960), "Retail Board of Trade," In re Rice, 53 FTC 5 (1956), "Allied Information Service" and "National Deposit System," In re Wacksman, 56 FTC 1615 (1960), "Cavalier Reserve Fund" and "Liberty Reserve Fund," In re Pitler, 56 FTC 803 (1960) and "National Clearance Bureau," National Clearance Bureau v. FTC, 255 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1958). Another collection agency called itself the "United States Association of Credit Bureaus." The use of this name was held to violate §5 of the FTC Act on the ground that it was not an "association," or a "credit bureau," nor connected with the "United States." In re United States Ass'n of Credit Bureaus, Inc., 58 FTC 1044 (1961), aff'd United States Ass'n of Credit Bureaus, Inc. v. FTC, 299 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1962). This is interesting, given the positioning on a verbal dispute that only provides limited protection for a consumer: Requests that the consumer telephone the debt collector induce the consumer to waive his right to verification by failing to make the request in writing, as required. Miller v. Payco‑General American Credits, Inc., supra, 943 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991); Woolfolk v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Conn. 1990); Flowers v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections, 96 C 4003, 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3354, 1997 WL 136313 (N.D.Ill. Mar 19, 1997). Contra, Terran v. Kaplan, supra. "A consumer calling the defendant would not be exercising her validation rights and would not be entitled to the statutory cessation of debt collection activities." Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1404, 1412 (D. Conn. 1990). On the other hand, the inclusion of a settlement offer that expired shortly before the end of the validation period has been held not to violate §1692g. Harrison v. NBD, Inc., supra, 968 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The notice should specify that the debt has 30 days after receipt of the letter to dispute the debt. Vera v. Trans-Continental Credit & Collection Corp., 98 Civ. 1866, 1999 WL 292623. Sassy
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? I posted the answers you wanted, that is not grown up? Or, did you really not want the answers, only wanted to provoke JDP by making demands that you yourself won't provide? Sassy
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? "What was your position when you filed, that your report should have been updated to disputed based on an oral dispute?" Exactly. " I know you don't like the Spears case; however, it says just the opposite, at issue was the amount of attorney's fees, not the entire debt." Actually, I LOVE the Spears case! I only wish Graziano and a host of other Federal cases mirrored it! But I certainly would be on shaky ground using a State Court of Appeals case as the foundation for any federal action. "Which reminds me, if you wouldn't mind sharing, the FDCPA does not require any communication with a consumer at all. As southland received his validation rights in the form of a summons/ complaint as an initial communication, is there an assumption somewhere that most CA's provide the validation notice -- frequently people don't find out about a collection account until they happen to review their reports, if ever. Do you think the lack of an initial communication with the consumer giving the validation notice is a violation?" I think with the changes to 15 USC 1692e(11) which do not require such notice in legal pleadings scared many attorneys who do not "communicate" with consumers except in the form of formal pleadings in a lawsuit. Since no changes were made to 15 USC 1692g et seq. providing the same omission, and the Supreme Court decision that purely legal activities (such as filing pleadings) and the filing attorneys were covered by the Act [Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)], many lawyers wisely chose to err on the side of caution and issue a "standard" collection letter with e(11) and g(a), waited 30-35 days, and THEN filed their suits. I think the lack of an initial communication with the consumer conveying the validation notice and e(11) (since it's a letter) IS a violation where ANY collection activity follows -including the filing of a lawsuit-.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: JDP Pro Se - please answer? People: My previous posts were under JDP Pro Se. Unfortunately, someone who posted a thread "Hiding90=JDP Pro Se" was believed by a CN Steve and I no longer can post in that name nor have access to it. It is alleged that an IP address matched one in Los Angeles(?) I can assure all that I am a resident of Suburban Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and have no knowledge whatsoever of this "Hiding90" character, much less have I ever used that monicker. It seems my postings here were poorly timed contemporaneously with this poster's "banning", and no matter how much I e-mail the administrator, I can not motivate a response and JDP Pro Se can not be used. I won't be posting anymore in this forum. It would only be a matter of time before this name too was inactivated. I had much to learn here as well as to contribute, but I can not do the impossible and prove a negative. In closing I bid you all good luck in your endeavors. I will remain posting in collectionindustry.com and checking out the "art" thing web site. It's been real, and fun, but it hasn't been real fun. PEACE John
