Notice to assigns is notice to pr..

Discussion in 'Credit Talk' started by dixidriftr, Apr 27, 2004.

  1. dixidriftr

    dixidriftr Well-Known Member

    Ok here maybe a way on how to stop the junk debt collectors.

    Once I heard the verbiage:

    "Notice to principle is notice to assigns. Notice to assigns is notice to principle."

    If a cease communication letter with that verbiage is sent to a past SOL CA, and the CA either sells to or recruites another CA to collect on the debt, would the subsequent CA be violating a consumers instructions to cease communication if it sent a dunning letter?
     
  2. southland2

    southland2 Active Member

    dix:
    Have you found any case law on this?
    southland2.
     
  3. hiding90

    hiding90 Banned

    no :)
     
  4. jam237

    jam237 Well-Known Member

    The clause which you are referring is the TAR clause, because it 'tars' the notice to anyone who touches the account in the future.

    The version of the tar clause that I use is
    "NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT. NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL.
    APPLIES TO ALL SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS."

    Agents have a "DUTY TO INFORM" the principal with information relevant to the agents tasks.

    The TAR clause expresses that duty to inform the client with the information in the notice.

    Also, in matters of the FDCPA it is mearly an expression of the consumers right to ensure that transfer or sale of the account does not subject the consumer to actions which are prohibited by the act.

    Since hiding likes his caselaw, this is just one case which mentions notice to agent... :)

    http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/nc-supreme-court/jun2194/welchbuiders

    "The dispositive issue presented is whether the evidence before the Commission supports the finding that Sanders did not receive the notice of cancellation.

    A workers' compensation policy can be cancelled by the insurance company "for nonpayment of premium on 10 days' written notice to the insured." N.C.G.S. 97-99(a) (1991). There is no requirement that the notice of intent to cancel due to nonpayment of premium be sent by registered or certified mail. Id.

    Evidence of the deposit in the mails of a letter, properly stamped and addressed, establishes prima facie that it was received in the regular course of the mail by the addressee. 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence 65, at 215-16 (4th ed. 1993) (hereinafter Brandis); Parnell-Martin Supply Co. v. High Point Motor Lodge, Inc., 277 N.C. 312, 321, 177 S.E.2d 392, 397 (1970) (regular course of the mail determined by the "frequency or usual course and time of the mail between the mailing place and place of purported receipt of letter"); In re Terry, 317 N.C. 132, 136, 343 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1986); 31A C.J.S. Evidence 136d (1964).

    Evidence of nonreceipt of the letter by the addressee or by his agent, see Passmore v. Woodard, 37 N.C. App. 535, 541, 246 S.E.2d 795, 800 (1975) (notice to agent is notice to principal); see also 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice 4, at 573 (1989), is some evidence that the letter was not mailed and raises a question of fact for the trier of fact. 1 Brandis 65, at 216.

    In this case, there is evidence that Selective sent to Sanders, by certified mail, a properly addressed, postage pre-paid notice of its intent to cancel Sanders' workers' compensation insurance policy. There is also some evidence that Sanders did not personally receive the letter. There is, however, no evidence that Sanders' agent, his secretary whose duties included handling the mail, did not receive the letter. Thus, because there is no evidence that Sanders' secretary did not receive the letter, the inference created by the establishment of the prima facie case -- that the letter was received by Sanders -- is not rebutted. Accordingly, the Commission erred in finding that Sanders did not have notice of the cancellation.

    Furthermore, the evidence in this case supports a finding that the notice was received by Sanders at least ten days prior to 11 September 1989, the date of the cancellation of the policy of insurance. The notice was mailed by Selective from its office in Branchville, New Jersey on 25 August 1989 to both Sanders and Winecoff. Winecoff received the notice on 27 or 28 August. This evidence supports a finding that the regular course of the mail, or the time necessary for the transmission of a letter, from Branchville, New Jersey to Highlands, North Carolina (a town located approximately thirty miles from Franklin) was three or four days and that Sanders received his letter within three or four days of the 25 August mailing."
     

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