received summons

No docket #?
No dates?

Sounds like a collection letter dressed up as a summons to shake you into paying.

If it says, somewhere, that you have 30 days to dispute this, (and it probably does), then send them a CMRRR letter that says "I dispute this debt in its entirety and demand validation."

If the debt is yours and you want to pay it, then send them your offer in writing (and include the condition that they not report this to the CRAs).

If you want to make some money, this might be a case of "overshadowing" (e.g. summons, "30 days to answer before they seek judgement" but it depends on the exact wording and format of their letter/summons) in which case you could take them to court for an FDCPA violation.

You have a few options and possibly some homework to do.

 

What courthouse is on the summons? If you are in doubt that it is a real summons, then head on over to your courthouse and find out for sure. Ask to see the file.

 

WVANATIVE i wish you well - im in the process of going thru kinda close to what ur going thru as i received my 20 notice to answer a summons & complaint from an attorney out here in the RENO NEVADA area & w/o the help from this forum i'd have been screwed bigtime becouse they would have simply won via a default judgement . the people on this forum are very knowledgable so my advise would be to listen & follow what enigima & others tell you ...... all i can say is im glad i followed their suggestions becouse sure i can & could still lose the lawsuit but at least i'll not go down w/o a fight !!! good luck , Julie ...................

 

Were you served this by a law enforcement official or process server? Did it simply come in the mail?

 

May as well . . .

Also, you may have a FDCPA violation for the Affadavit. You would need to check your state law to see any requirements it imposes.

 

Do a Sworn Denial to counter their affidavit.

 

Some jurisdiction have specific requirements in contract actions wherein certain proof must be supplied with the Complaint. Moreover, some jurisdictions have a specific way in which Affidavits must be plead and presented. The person who signed yours is questionable and open for preliminary objections at the least. It could give rise to a FDCPA violation is it can be construed as deceptive or misleading.

You would need to check the S.C. Code to see if there is anything enumerated as to how an Affidavit may be introduced.

 

Search for Parole Evidence Rule, Hearsay Evidence, Business Exception, etc.

 

If you can get access to your local law library (in the Circuit Court or even S. Ct. if not far from your Capitol) get on Lexis or West and search these terms that Enigma suggested.

In addition, see if you can locate a "Michie's" and it should have some good info . . .

 

http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/1002708-1.html
http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/laws/1105364-1.html
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/summaryCourtBenchBook/HTML/CivilL.htm
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E01EEDC1238EE3BBC4950DFB667838F649FDE


Bills and Notes. Admissibility of Parol Evidence Showing Negotiations prior to Delivery of Cashier's Check. Preference
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 5 (May, 1935), pp. 773-774
doi:10.2307/1115754

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=sc&vol=20010709145725.B78BB&invol=1

 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

Tracy Lynn Penton, Respondent,

V.

J.F. Cleckley ∧ Company
and South Carolina Department
of Transportation, Defendants,

of whom

J.F. Cleckley & Company is Respondent,

and

South Carolina Department
of Transportation is Appellant.

Appeal From Colleton County
Luke N. Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 24638
Heard November 19, 1996 - Filed June 23, 1997

AFFIRMED

Marvin C. Jones, Christy S. Stephens, and Elbert 0. Duffie, III, of Bogoslow & Jones, of Walterboro, for appellant.

J. Kevin Holmes and Malcolm M. Crosland, of Steinberg Law Firm, of Charleston, for respondent Tracy Lynn Penton.

Thomas H. Hesse and Sean K. Trundy, of Wise, Pratt- Thomas, Pearce, Epting & Walker, P.A., of Charleston, for

11

PENTON v. J.F. CLECKLY & CO.,et al.

respondent J.F. Cleckley &; Company.

WALLER, AJ.: Respondent Tracy Lynn Penton sued Respondent J.F. Cleckley & Co. ("Cleckley") and Appellant South Carolina Department , of Transportation ("Department") for injuries she received when her car ran off Highway 17-A in Colleton County and overturned. Department is appealing the jury's verdict finding it solely liable in the amount of $200,000 and the trial judge's finding it was not protected by an indemnity bond taken out by Cleckley.

FACTS

On the afternoon of July 15, 1990, Penton was traveling south on Highway 17- A, a two-lane road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. As she was passing a car ahead of her, she felt a sudden jerk on the left side of her car (she was in the left lane) and her car left the pavement. When she pulled her car back onto the pavement, the car started fishtailing and she lost control. The car went off the left side of the road and flipped down an embankment. Penton was thrown from the car and broke her back.

The section of road on which the accident occurred had been recently re-paved by Cleckley, a resurfacing contractor hired by Department. Penton alleged Cleckley failed to perform the resurfacing contract according to its provisions; created a dangerous three- to four-inch drop off on the road's shoulder; failed to build up the road's shoulder to correct the drop off; and failed to warn drivers by placing signs or barriers near the drop off. She alleged Department failed to warn drivers by placing signs or barriers near the drop off and failed to correct the drop off by building up the shoulder of the road.

Both Cleckley and Department counterclaimed alleging contributory negligence. Department also cross-claimed against Cleckley, alleging the indemnity bond Cleckley was required to get insulated it from liability and that Cleckley was solely at fault. Cleckley and Department agreed that the trial judge would rule on the indemnity bond issue after the jury reached a verdict regarding who was liable. After the jury found Department solely liable, the trial judge found it was not protected by the indemnity bond.

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in admitting testimony regarding allocation of responsibilities under the resurfacing contract?

II. Did the trial court err in finding Cleckley did not have a duty to indemnify Department?

p12

PENTON v. J.F. CLECKLY & CO.,et al.

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Testimony

Department argues the trial judge improperly allowed testimony of its employees regarding their understanding of the parties' responsibilities under the resurfacing contract. We disagree.

As noted above, Penton sued Department alleging it had not corrected a dangerous low shoulder or drop off created when Cleckley re-paved the road, and that it had failed to place appropriate signs warning about the condition. Department's position was that pursuant to the resurfacing contract, Cleckley assumed these responsibilities. Thus the contract's interpretation, which was introduced into the record1, became very important in this case.

At trial, four witnesses testified regarding their understanding of these

_____________________ 1Special provision number 28 addressed Cleckley's responsibility for shoulders:

Dressing of Shoulders: The Contractor shall perform= any necessary work that is required in order that the shoulders of the roadway are left in a near [sic] and presentable condition. This work shall include any blading work necessary to replace or remove any disturbed material adjacent to the pavement edge in order to eliminate any drop off. No direct payment shall e made for this work, but the costs shall be included in the price of other items.

Specification 107.11 addressed Cleckley's responsibility for signs:

Barricades, Warning Signs, Detour Signs and Traffic Control Devices. The Contractor, without extra compensation ... shall provide, erect and aintain in good condition all necessary barricades, suitable and sufficient lights, danger signals, signs and other traffic control devices; shall provide qualified flagmen where necessary to direct the traffic; and shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the work, the warning that the road is under construction, and the safety of the public. ... Suitable warning signs shall be provided to properly control and direct traffic. ... The Contractor shall erect warning signs in advance of any place on the project where operations may interfere with the use of the road by traffic, and at all intermediate points where the new work crosses or coincides with existing roads which are open to traffic.

The Department will erect and maintain signs on detours or temporary routes that the Contractor is not required to maintain, but the Contractor shall provide and maintain such signs at and along all detours for which he is responsible. The Contractor shall maintain and relocate, where necessary, all regulatory, warning and guide signs in place of those that may be erected by the Department, within the limits of his contract.

13

PENTON v. J.F. CLECKLY & CO.,et al.

contractual provisions, three of which were employees of Department. All testifiedthat under Special Provision 28, the contractor had to remove dirt pushed up against the edge of the road so that there would be a clean area to resurface. After re-paving is completed, the contractor must then bring the dirt that was removed back up to the edge of the road. Once done, it is Department's responsibility to bring in an additional dirt to bring the road's shoulder back up to the level of the pavement. They also testified Department was responsible for putting up low shoulder signs. This was because when additional material is needed to build up shoulders, the Department cannot go in immediately and do it during the summer because the new asphalt has to "cure." Therefore, Department solves the safety problem of the lag time (when there would be a low shoulder) by placing low shoulder signs.

 

Department argues the testimony regarding who was responsible for placing low shoulder signs was inadmissible because it varied the terms of the written contract between it and Cleckley.2 We disagree. Under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated agreement. See, e.g., Levy v. Outdoor Resorts, 304 S.C. 427, 405 S.E.2d 387 (1991). However, where a contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the true meaning and intent of the parties. Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Devp. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20 (1977); Skinner v. Elrod, 308 S.C. 239, 417 S.E.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1992). An ambiguous contract is one capable of being understood in more ways than just one or one unclear in meaning because it expresses its purpose in an indefinite manner. Klutts Resort Realty, Inc., supra. See also Carolina Ceramics, Inc. v. Carolina Pipeline Co.., 251 S.C. 151, 161 E.2d 179 (1968) (contract is ambiguous if obscure in meaning or has double meaning); U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Janicare, Inc., 294 S.C. 312, 364 S.E.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1988) (where contract is silent as to particular matter and because of nature and character oftransaction ambiguity arises, parol evidence admissible to supply the language's deficiency and establish true intent and meaning so long as the evidence is not contradictory).

We find the language in Specification 107.11 is ambiguous. Reading the section as a whole, it is unclear exactly what type of signs are required to be put up by the contractor; the first phrase could be read to only require signs used to control traffic. Whether a low shoulder warning sign is a traffic control sign is not addressed, nor is "traffic control device" defined. It is clear that the contractor is not required to provide every sign used during construction. More importantly, this section is unclear about whether the contractor's responsibility only extends to putting up signs when it is actually performing road construction. The evidence in

_______________ 2At oral argument, Department conceded it had the responsibility to decide, after the repaving contractor had moved back material it originally disturbed, where low shoulders existed and to then build them back up to acceptable standards as determined by Department. Therefore, we do not consider whether the testimony on this issue violated the parol evidence rule.

p14

PENTON v. J.F. CLECKLY & CO.,et al.

the record shows Cleckley had completed its re-paving and had moved on to another road long before Penton's accident. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Department conceded it had the responsibility to determine where the shoulders needed to be built up. In other words, Department resumed control of any further construction at that point (at least in regard to building up the shoulders). The record also shows that nowhere are there any set guidelines for what constitutes a low shoulder. The inherent conflict in all of this evidence is apparent: how can a contractor know where to place low shoulder signs if it does not have the responsibility of determining where low shoulders exist?3 Because there is simply no way of knowing, by merely reading this contract, what Cleckley was supposed to do after it finished re-paving the road, we find the testimony was properly admitted to explain it.4

II. Indemnity Agreement

The resurfacing contract required Cleckley to indemnify Department "from allsuits or claims of any character brought because of any injuries or damage received

3The fact that Cleckley had not received "final acceptance" of its work at the time of the accident does not resolve this issue. No one contests that until such acceptance was received (which occurred after Penton's accident), Cleckley still had to perform its contractual obligations. The primary issue in this case, however, is exactly what these obligations were. 4We reject Department's argument that the best evidence rule was violated in this case. This rule provides that when the contents of a writing are sought to be proved, the original document must be produced unless some reason can be shown for its unavailability. See 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 1049 (1994). The best evidence rule has no application here because the contract was introduced into evidence. Furthermore, this objectionable testimony was not introduced to state what the contract terms were but to show how the parties interpreted them.

Additionally, Respondents argue Department waived this argument because it did not object to some of this testimony. Respondents also argue the testimony was admissible regardless of the parole evidence rule because it was given by Department's employees and therefore qualified as admissions by a party. We decline to decide this issue on these bases. The parole evidence rule is a rule not of evidence but of substantive law. Therefore, admission of evidence violating this rule is legally incompetent and should not be considered even if no objection to it was made at trial. See Muckelvaney v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 63, 198 S.E.2d 278 (1973); Adams v. Marchbanks, 253 S.C. 280@ 170 S.E.2d 214 (1969); 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1098 (1994); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 851 (1964) (parol evidence rule considered rule of substantive law "because the law requires the te=s of the agreement to be found in the writing itself and not because of any reasons which ordinarily require the exclusion of evidence, such as some policy against its admission, or its untrustworthiness or lack of probative value").

15

PENTON v. J.F. CLECKLY & CO.,et al.

or sustained by any person, persons, or property on account of...any act or omission, neglect, or misconduct of said contractor." In accordance with this requirement, Cleckley executed a performance and indemnity bond in the amount of $658,622.40. The parties agreed to wait until the jury had decided liability before dealing with this issue as part of the post-trial motions. After the jury found Department was solely liable for Penton's injuries, the trial judge held Cleckley did not have a duty to indemnify. Department argues this was error. We disagree.

Department argues Cleckley should have to indemnify because (1) section 15-78-60(15) of the South Carolina Tor-t Claims Act limits its liability and (2) Cleckley contractually assumed the duties it was found to have breached. We reject both arguments. First, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(15) (Supp. 1995) provides the governmental entity is not liable for loss when it is protected by an indemnity bond. This is certainly not dispositive since the entire issue here is whether Department is protected by this bond. Second, under the contract terms Department may only seek indemnification when a claim is made for injury "on account of ... any act or omission, neglect, or misconduct" of Cleckley. Penton sued both parties and the jury clearly found no fault on the part of Cleckley. We find this jury verdict dispositive of the indemnification issue. Therefore, the judge's ruling was proper.

Finally, we affirm the remaining issues pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Issue III: Foggie v. CSX Transp., 313 S.C. 98, 431 S.E.2d 587 (1993) (motion to amend and ruling on prejudice addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge). Issue IV: Lee v. Suess, -I 1 8S.C. 2-U 457 S.E.2d 344 (1995) (qualification and admission of expert testimony are within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overruled absent a finding of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the complaining party).

For the foregoing reasons, the jury's verdict and the trial judge's ruling in this case are hereby

AFFRIMED

FINNEY, C.J., MOORE, and BURNETT, JJ., concur. TOAL, A.J., concurs in result.

16

 

4283 - HK New Plan v. Coker

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

HK New Plan Exchange Property Owner I, LLC, Respondent,

v.

Dale A. Coker and Bradley Coker, d/b/a Japan Karate Institute, Defendants,

of whom Bradley A. Coker is Appellant.

Appeal From Dorchester County
James C. Williams, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 4283
Heard April 3, 2007 â?? Filed July 26, 2007

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Jay T. Gouldon and R. Spencer Roddey, both of Charleston, for Appellant.

Kirby Gould Mason, and Robert Bates Lovett, both of Savannah, Georgia, for Respondent.

BEATTY, J.: In this breach of contract action, Bradley Coker appeals the trial courtâ??s grant of summary judgment to HK New Plan Exchange Property Owner I, LLC (HK New Plan) finding a lease renewal and amendment did not release Bradley from the original lease. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Dale Coker, Bradleyâ??s father, provided martial arts lessons through his business, Japan Karate Institute (the Institute). Bradley worked at the Institute but was not an owner. The Instituteâ??s main location was in West Ashley. On December 28, 1998, Bradley and Dale entered into a five-year lease (the Original Lease) with Festival Centre, LLC (Festival) to rent a space at the Festival Shopping Center to house the North Charleston location of the Institute. The lease period began on March 1, 1999, and was to expire on February 29, 2004.

Around December 2001, the Institute began having problems with the floors at its North Charleston location due in part to termite damage. In April 2002, Bradleyâ??s wife, Roeman Coker, tried to mediate the problems between Dale and the leasing company. According to Roeman, the representative for the leasing company informed her that Dale would have to sign a long lease as a prerequisite to getting the floors fixed and Dale agreed to do so.

In July 2002, Bradley stopped working at the Institute. The Institute received the new lease Dale had agreed to sign. The lease arrived with Bradleyâ??s name on it. Roeman contacted the leasing company to have Bradleyâ??s name removed from the new lease and the Original Lease. After speaking with the leasing companyâ??s legal department, Roeman sent a letter to Festival requesting it remove Bradleyâ??s name from the lease because he did not have an ownership interest and was no longer employed by the Institute.

Dale and Festival subsequently executed a â??Standard Lease Renewal and First Amendmentâ? (the Amendment). The relevant provisions are as follows:

3. Tenantâ??s Legal Name: Dale A. Coker

5. Tenantâ??s Trade Name: Japan Karate Institute

7. The Lease: Originally dated on or about December 28, 1998 and entered into by Festival Centre, LLC, as Landlord, and Bradley Dale Coker as Tenant, to which Dale A. Coker, is successor in interest.

9. Revised Lease Term: The term of the lease is hereby extended an additional period of five (5) years commencing March 1, 2004 and expiring February 28, 2009.

The Amendment further provided:

This agreement is entered into by the Landlord and Tenant, as set forth above, and is intended to be an amendment of the Lease described above. Any provision of this amendment which is inconsistent with any provision(s) of the Lease shall supersede the provision(s) in the Lease. Also, any ambiguities and conflicts between this Amendment and the Lease shall be read in favor of the Amendment. Except as amended hereby, all other terms and conditions of the Lease shall remain in full force and effect, and the terms of this Amendment shall be fully incorporated into, and apply in addition to the terms of, the Lease.

The Amendment also stated, â??This Standard Lease Renewal and Amendment shall be effective upon the execution by both Landlord and Tenant below . . . .â? The tenant signature line only listed â??Dale A. Coker,â? and he was the only party to sign as a tenant. Dale signed on September 5, 2002, and Festival signed on October 28, 2002. On December 12, 2002, Festival conveyed the shopping center to HK New Plan.

At some point, HK New Plan stopped receiving rent payments from Dale Coker. On January 25, 2005, HK New Plan filed a complaint against Dale and Bradley: alleging breach of contract for failure to pay rent; accelerating the rent due from July 1, 2003, through February 28, 2009, which amounted to $171,578.04; and requesting costs and attorneyâ??s fees. Bradley and Dale filed separate answers, and Bradley filed a motion for summary judgment. HK New Plan also filed a motion for summary judgment in which it recognized Bradley was not liable for the rent due during the renewal period, and HK New Plan reduced its claim against Bradley to only the rent owed for the period between July 1, 2003, and February 29, 2004.

The trial court found nothing in the Amendment released Bradley from his obligation under the Original Lease or modified the Original Lease. The court determined that Bradley was bound for the full period of the Original Lease, granted HK New Planâ??s motion for summary judgment, and denied Bradleyâ??s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

â??The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases which do not require the services of a fact finder.â? George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002).

In determining whether a triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all factual inferences drawn must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003). Even if evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary judgment should be denied where the conclusions or inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts conflict. Baugus v. Wessinger, 303 S.C. 412, 415, 401 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1991). â??Summary judgment is not appropriate when further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of law.â? Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be cautiously invoked in order not to improperly deprive a litigant of a trial of the disputed factual issues. Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 138, 542 S.E.2d 743, 747 (Ct. App. 2001).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Bradley contends the Amendment created an ambiguity, and the interpretation of the Amendment was a material question of fact for the jury. We agree.[1]

Generally, the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 325 S.C. 231, 234, 482 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1997). Where a motion for summary judgment presents a question as to the construction of a written contract, if the language employed by the agreement is plain and unambiguous, the question is one of law. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Conway Natâ??l Bank, 282 S.C. 303, 305, 317 S.E.2d 776, 777 (Ct. App. 1984). â??In such a case, summary judgment is proper and a trial unnecessary where the intention of the parties as to the legal effect of the contract may be gathered from the four corners of the instrument itself.â? Id.

 

However, summary judgment is improper where the motion presents a question as to the construction of a written contract, and the contract is ambiguous because the intent of the parties can not be gathered from the four corners of the instrument. Bishop v. Benson, 297 S.C. 14, 17, 374 S.E.2d 517, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1988). Where a contract is unclear, or is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the partiesâ?? intentions are matters of fact to be submitted to a jury. Wheeler v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of City of N.Y., 125 S.C. 320, 325, 118 S.E. 609, 610 (1923). Under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a contract. Penton v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 326 S.C. 275, 280, 486 S.E.2d 742, 745 (1997). â??However, if a contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain the true meaning and intent of the parties.â? Koontz v. Thomas, 333 S.C. 702, 709, 511 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 1999). An ambiguous contract is a contract capable of being understood in more than one way or a contract unclear in meaning because it expresses its purpose in an indefinite manner. Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Downâ??Round Dev. Corp., 268 S.C. 80, 89, 232 S.E.2d 20, 25 (1977).

We find the Amendment creates ambiguities. The Amendment lists only Dale as the tenant, refers to Dale as Bradleyâ??s â??successor in interest,â? and has a signature line only for Dale. Despite language that any Amendment provision inconsistent with the Original Lease supersedes the Original Lease, the Amendment does not specifically state that Bradley is released from the Original Lease. Thus, a question is raised regarding the partiesâ?? intent, and the matter should be determined by a jury.

Further, the Amendment indicates that it becomes â??effectiveâ? upon signing by the parties, but it also states that the revised lease term â??commencesâ? March 1, 2004. HK New Plan interprets the Amendment to mean that Bradley was subject to the Original Lease until March 1, 2004, and Bradley interprets it to mean that he was released immediately upon the signing of the Amendment. Because even the parties have differing interpretations of the import of the â??effectiveâ? and â??commencementâ? dates, an ambiguity was created by the Amendment.

The Amendment does not specifically state that the parties intended to release Bradley from the Original Lease, nor does it specify whether the commencement date or the effective date was significant in making Dale the sole tenant. This court need not decide whether it favors Bradleyâ??s or HK New Planâ??s view of the Amendment at this juncture; we need only determine whether the provision is ambiguous. Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 301 S.C. 295, 299, 391 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1990). We find the provisions in the Amendment created ambiguities that must be determined by a jury. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Because the Amendment is ambiguous, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of HK New Plan. Accordingly, the trial courtâ??s decision is

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

HUFF and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1] Bradley also alternately argues that the language of the Amendment is clear that the parties intended to release him from liability and that the court erred in failing to admit parol evidence if there was an ambiguity. Because we reverse based upon the ambiguity created in the Amendment, we need not reach the alternative issues on appeal. Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding that the court need not rule on remaining issues when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

 

http://www.scalc.net/decisions.aspx?q=4&id=8011
http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25004

 

SC Rules of Evidence:

http://www.spartanburgmagistrates.com/rules/evidence.htm

 

That should do it . . .